We use survey data to examine whether law and legal institutions add value to Russian transactions. Enterprises view legal institutions relatively benignly. Inter-enterprise contacts are important in resolving transactional problems, but courts are used when negotiations fail. Legal strategies affect transactional success, while the potential for hold-up reduces success and the nature of ownership and control affect the ability to sustain relationships. We conclude that law works in Russia because our results show that the economic and institutional environment rewards enterprises that invest effort in constructing contracts, that possess superior legal knowledge, and that orient legal work to new opportunities.
-4-courts that exist today. The Soviet heritage has not been entirely helpful in building respect and authority for the new arbitrazh courts. Gosarbitrazh made no pretense of independence and although it superficially resembled a court in that it resolved disputes among state enterprises, the primary goal of the decision-makers (arbiters) was to facilitate fulfillment of the national economic plan. This historical legacy has sometimes encouraged Western observers to dismiss the courts as an important actor (e.g., Black and Kraakman 1996; Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996) .
The arbitrazh courts break with the past in terms of their structure, function, and procedures (Hendley 1998b; Pistor 1996) . A new procedural code was adopted in 1991, marking the change from administrative agency to court. This code was thoroughly reworked in 1995 as part of the continuing effort to make the arbitrazh process more "court-like" (APK). Decision-makers are no longer arbiters but full-fledged judges, and the courts' functions have greatly expanded (Hendley 1998a) . Cases now submitted to the arbitrazh courts run the gamut from garden-variety contractual disputes to complex issues of commercial law and corporate governance (Hendley 1998c) . In contrast to the past, decisions are to be based solely on the law: the political and/or economic ramifications are not to be considered.
II. The General Perspectives of Enterprises
One straightforward way to assess the functioning of Russian legal institutions is to ask enterprise officials questions about the quality of such institutions. At first blush, this approach seems easy to implement. However, the data obtained in response can be disturbingly elusive to interpret. Suppose one-third of Russian enterprise managers have confidence in legal institutions. Is this low or high?
Perhaps, one would obtain the same degree of confidence expressed by managers in OECD countries, so that Russia is comparable to other countries in this respect. Perhaps fewer Russian managers have confidence in any other Russian institution, so that legal institutions perform relatively well in Russia.
As the above immediately suggests, the solution to this problem of data interpretation is to take a determinedly comparative approach, to compare Russia to other countries, to compare Russian legal -5-2. The question was simply: "For each of the following, how much confidence do you have in them? A great deal, quite a lot, not very much, none at all." 3. The civil service was referred to as state administration in Russia. institutions to other Russian institutions, and to compare the comparative status of legal institutions across countries. The application of this approach, however, is hindered by the paucity of existing survey information on legal institutions in other countries, at least information that can be profitably used given the present study's focus. Nevertheless, we did find in the existing literature a small set of studies that contained both pertinent survey questions and Western responses to those questions. After administering identical questions in Russia and comparing Western and Russian responses, we obtained a useful introductory picture, one consistent with that obtained by the other methodologies pursued in this paper.
II.a Confidence in Institutions
One question that has been posed in a number of countries elicits information on how much confidence the respondent holds in a variety of institutions.
2 Table 1 presents data for four institutions (legal system, the police, the civil service, 3 and parliament) from four different surveys, including our own. When examining these data, it is important to keep in mind the different sample populations and the varying time periods of the surveys, as noted in the Table. When compared to the UK responses, the earlier responses for the legal system for Russia (in 1991) and Poland (in 1989) suggest a surprisingly high degree of confidence in legal institutions. The Russian businessmen in 1997 do have significantly less confidence in their legal system than does the 1991 Russian populace, but this could reflect the overall loss of confidence in all public-sector institutions from 1991 to 1997, which is clearly evidenced in the table. Nevertheless, the views of the Russian businessmen on the legal system are comparable to those of the UK general populace. Using the data in the upper-left quadrant of Table 1 , it would be difficult to make the case that the Russian legal system has egregious problems compared to the legal systems in other countries.
-6-4. See the references in Hendrix 1997 Hendrix , pp. 1075 Hendrix -1077 , who, it should be emphasized, does not subscribe to this notion.
This conclusion is strengthened when cast in the perspective of the survey responses for other institutions. Russian enterprise managers clearly have more confidence in legal institutions than in the civil service, the parliament, and the police. While the Russian responses for the legal system are similar to those of the UK sample, the responses for the other three institutions are not. Moreover, the apparent loss in confidence in Russian institutions between 1991 and 1997 is much less for the legal system than for the three other public-sector institutions. At a minimum, these data suggest that it would be erroneous to claim that Russian businessmen view their legal system relatively negatively.
II.b Honesty and Ethical Standards
Some commentators allege that corruption is rife in the Russian judicial system. 4 These allegations, especially when applied to the arbitrazh courts, seem to be based more on observation of the general level of corruption in Russia than on any specific information about the courts themselves. Nevertheless,
given that judicial institutions can only be effective if they are perceived as having integrity, it seems appropriate to examine whether these allegations are mirrored in the views of Russian businessmen. Table 2 presents the results from our survey and a comparable western one on the question: "How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of the types of people listed [in the survey question]?"
The findings in this Table clearly show that enterprise officials view the arbitrazh judges as having relatively high ethical standards. (We were not able to find comparable information on Western judges.)
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that the legal system should be clearly distinguished from other elements of the Russian institutional structure when corruption is discussed.
The relatively positive view of the legal system offered in Tables 1 and 2 is combined, however, with evidence of weakness in related institutions that are crucial to the overall functioning of legal processes. The ability of judicial officials to execute their primary functions reliably depends to some extent on the complementary provision of services by a number of other legal professionals, including -7-lawmakers, prosecutors, lawyers, bailiffs, and police. Clearly, the previous Tables suggest that some key aspects of the legal systemmost notably the lawmakers and the policeare poorly regarded by the business community and the public at large.
II.c The Problems of Businesses: Crime and Litigation
Conventional wisdom on Russian business would offer the following characterization: criminal groups are of great concern, while the courts have no power and therefore enterprises have no need to fear a suit from an aggrieved trading partner. Questions taken from previous Western surveys allow us to examine this conventional wisdom. Table 3 reports the responses to the question "How worried are you, if at all, that you might become a victim of violent crime during the coming year?" Crime is more of a problem for some strata of Russian enterprise officials than for the US general public. In particular, enterprise directors and managers of sales departments, who are more likely to interact with banks and the cash-based retail sector, fear crime more than do either Russian purchasing officials (who interact with industrial enterprises) or the US public.
However, Table 4 shows that litigation is perceived as more serious a problem for Russian enterprises than is the activity of criminal groups. These responses are remarkable given that the Russian have limited powers to implement their judgements. Thus, while the evidence on problems of crime that appears in Tables 3 and 4 could easily be explained by factors quite irrelevant to the enforcement of transactions, for example, simple criminality, the roughly comparable concern for litigation evidenced in Table 4 can only suggest that court decisions are important for enterprises. The image conveyed by Tables 3 and 4 is hardly that of the "Wild East" that is so popular in the public imagination.
It has been suggested that the presence of criminal groups in Russian business is due to their effectiveness in contract enforcement compared to the courts (Hay, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; Leitzel, Gaddy & Alexeev 1995) . So how do the court and criminal enforcement compare? We asked enterprise -8-5. This section is drawn from a much more extensive examination of enterprise strategies (Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 1999) , which examines interactions with both customers and suppliers and includes extensive information on matters not included here, such as the nature of contractual terms. officials this question directly, using the term 'private methods of enforcement' to describe both legal and criminal forms of private enforcement. An English translation of the question is as follows: Firms in market economies use different methods to resolve serious disputes. In some cases, firms use courts. In other cases, they resort to private methods of enforcement. For example, the firm might hire a private security service or call on private individuals or groups to assist them in the collection of bad debts. In this question, we ask you to compare the effectiveness of these two methods for resolving disputes in Russia --Private Enforcement versus arbitrazh Courts--based on five criteria: speed, competence, low cost, certainty of enforcement, and confidentiality. Please convey your views by choosing a point on a scale from 0 to 10. A '0' means you absolutely prefer Private Enforcement based on the criterion and a '10' means you absolutely prefer arbitrazh Courts based on the criterion Table 5 shows that enterprises generally prefer arbitrazh courts to private methods. Along three dimensions, competence, cost, and confidentiality, managers rate the arbitrazh courts as significantly superior to private methods.
The evidence in this section has been soft and general, but it strongly suggests that systematic investigation of the role of law and legal institutions in the affairs of Russian enterprises is warranted.
Such investigation is the subject of the next two sections.
III. Enforcing Agreements
Contractual disputes between enterprises dominate the types of cases decided by the arbitrazh courts (Hendley 1998c) . Presumably, then, the comparatively positive assessment of the Russian legal system by enterprise managers reflects the usefulness of the legal system in helping to structure and to enforce agreements between enterprises. In this section, we explore whether this is indeed the case, by examining the strategies that enterprises use to enforce agreements with their suppliers.
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In the enforcement of inter-enterprise agreements, law may or may not be germane. When the parties have a long history of mutually beneficial trading, they may rely simply on the integrity of their trading partners or on the disciplining effect of the threat of lost opportunities in the future. Law may -9-play a more meaningful role when the parties are not acquainted with each other or when they have good reason to distrust one another. The capacity of law to serve this function, however, depends on its own legitimacy within society. When law's authority is in question and business partners do not trust each other, they may turn to third parties for enforcement. These outsiders can take many forms, from people with the respect of the community to people who demand obedience at the point of a gun.
The popular press, both in Russia and the West, has created an image of the "Wild East," where law plays no meaningful role in enterprise relations. The scholarly literature regularly follows this line, arguing that Russia lacks the necessary legal structure to enforce contracts or uphold property rights (e.g., Eckstein et al 1998; Åslund 1995; McFaul 1995) and that enterprises routinely rely on private enforcers in order to ensure stability in business relations (e.g., DiPaola 1996; Leitzel, Gaddy & Alexeev 1995; Shelley 1995) . The following evidence on the use of different enforcement strategies in Russia challenges many aspects of this conventional view.
III.a The Spectrum of Strategies
To organize our discussion, we identify seven stylized enforcement strategies, covering the major alternatives available for enterprises in any country. This spectrum does not represent any natural ordering of strategies in terms of enterprise decision-making. Enterprises do not necessarily move from a strategy to an adjacent one as underlying conditions gradually change: they might jump from one end to the other. Moreover, enterprises can employ several strategies in their efforts to resolve a single problem.
1. Relational Contracting. This strategy assumes that enterprises trust each other to fulfill their contractual obligations, most usually because of a long history of interactions. The relationship is based on personal, not calculative, trust (Williamson 1993) . If problems arise, they are addressed through direct negotiations, often on an informal basis or by lower level officials. There is no recourse to outsiders or resort to the courts. The implicit threat that underlies such negotiations is that the relationship will be terminated if compromise cannot be reached. The potentially non-performing -10-enterprise is presumably sufficiently interested in maintaining the tie that it will modify its behavior accordingly.
2. Self-Enforcement. A small step away is self-enforcement. Self-enforcement might rely purely on each party's calculation that the other party has a self-interest in completing the deal. But contractual mechanisms can also provide both parties with an incentive to perform. Examples include letters of credit, barter, prepayment, and hostages (Williamson 1985) . In cases of non-performance, just as in relational contracting, the frame of reference is generally limited to the two contracting parties. Neither state institutions nor third-party private actors are affirmatively called upon for assistance.
3. Third Party Enforcement. An enterprise can turn to outsiders for help in enforcing agreements.
One form of such behavior is an appeal to individuals or associations that are perceived to have some influence over the trading partner. This represents a step away from self-reliance but does not yet presume state involvement or the use of extra-legal remedies. The assumption is that the trading partner will be concerned about its reputation with the third-parties and, fearing ostracism or lost business opportunities, will adapt its behavior.
4. Private Enforcement. When an enterprise experiences high levels of default among its trading partners and frustration with other enforcement mechanisms, it might hire private sector enforcement specialists. Such behavior assumes a lack of trust in the trading partner and in the capacity of the legal system to provide acceptable relief. This strategy is typically one that is multi-layered, often beginning with implicit threats, and sometimes culminating in the use of violence.
5. Administrative Levers of the State. Moving from private to state actors, an enterprise can ask government officials to pressure the trading partner. Even in market economies, governments have many levers of influence over enterprises and, depending on the circumstances, may be willing to use them.
Presumably, the non-performing enterprise will change its behavior rather than risk the state's ire, even if this displeasure would not immediately result in material sanctions.
-11-6. When the enterprise did not have a formal department for obtaining supplies, the person who carried out the relevant duties in the enterprise answered the survey.
6. Shadow of the Law. When relations between trading partners are characterized by a low level of trust, confiscatory remedies are often included in contracts to protect the parties in case of default.
Examples of these are collateral arrangements or penalty clauses. These differ from self-enforcement in that they are designed to be implemented by court action. When relations unravel, there will be communication that threatens to enforce these confiscatory contractual terms, including the possibility of a lawsuit to back up the threat. Settlement often follows, not out of any desire to maintain a long-term relationship, but because it is cheaper than litigation.
7. Litigation. At the opposite end of the spectrum from relational contracting is litigation. In most countries, filing a lawsuit typically indicates a breakdown in the relationship between the trading partners. Litigation is expensive in relationship terms. Harsh words are exchanged, and the trading relationship is sometimes irretrievably severed. Submitting a dispute to the courts implies an acceptance of the legitimacy of the institution, and a willingness to abide by its decision.
III.b The Use and Effectiveness of the Strategies in Russia
We examine information reported by the head of the purchasing department of the Russian enterprises. 6 Our discussion centers on the answers to a composite question, on the options enterprises had chosen to deal with problems, potential or actual, in transactions with suppliers over the two years preceding our survey. By matching each of the options with the strategies outlined above, these answers provide us with basic information on the use of each strategy. In Box 1, we reproduce an English version of the question addressed to enterprise officials. The question lists twelve methods of presenting and resolving problems, asking enterprises whether they used the method and how they rated its effectiveness on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 representing ineffective and 10 very effective.
-12- Table 6 summarizes enterprise responses. In column (1), we list the various methods of addressing disputes that appeared in the survey question and associate each method with one or more strategies on the spectrum discussed above. Column (2) lists the percentages of enterprises that used each method in the last two years. Column (3) summarizes the evaluations of effectiveness by presenting the mean of the 0-10 scale scores for the enterprises that used the method. The final column combines the information on extent of use and effectiveness, presenting a mean effectiveness score across all enterprises by assuming that the effectiveness of a method is 0 for those enterprises that did not use it.
Relational Contracting. Relationships are important in transactions everywhere. Table 6 provides Russian data consistent with that picture. The most frequently used methods of solving problems, and the most effective ones, are those that rely solely on enterprise-to-enterprise interactions. Foremost are formal meetings between lower level officials, which allow trading partners to resolve potential problems in a non-confrontational and relatively cheap manner. Presumably, when low level or informal meetings do note resolve the problem, the discussion is escalated to higher, more formal levels. More than onehalf of enterprises (56 percent) prevent or resolve problems by holding formal meetings between the general directors of the enterprises. Direct meetings between counterparts are generally regarded as effective by purchasing managers (column 3) even in the Russian environment of constantly broken promises and daily force majeure.
Self-Enforcement. Table 6 does not present direct information on self-enforcement, although the formal meetings between high-level officials might be interpreted in that vein, since such meetings would always implicitly contain the threat of severing trade relations. Elsewhere in the survey we sought information on the use of instruments that could be characterized as facilitating self-enforcement. We find that almost 8% of enterprises could be classified as using hostages: they are in possession of the seller's property during the execution of a purchasing agreement. 5% of the agreements on which we have data involve letters of credit. More pervasive is the use of prepayment and barter, which include -13-elements of self-enforcement. 74% of contracts for material supplies require some prepayment, with 45% requiring full prepayment. On average, 42% percent of purchases involved barter.
Third-Party Enforcement. Third-party enforcement exists in Russia, primarily in the form of assistance from other enterprises and, to a lesser extent, banks. Table 6 shows that 15% of purchasing directors have sought the assistance of other enterprises and 5% have sought the assistance of banks when problems arose with their suppliers. The use of informal enterprise networks for enforcement has only a weak formal counterpart. The data show the peripheral role of business associations and financial industrial groups in enforcement. Table 6 confirms the unimportance of political parties in post-Soviet inter-enterprise relations despite the heritage of Communist Party officials as the universal fixers of the Soviet economy (Granick 1961) . Only one of our 328 surveyed enterprises had sought help from a political party to prevent or solve its problems with suppliers, reflecting the disintegration of the old Communist Party structure and the changed role of the new political parties.
Private Enforcement. Two basic strategies for private enforcement exist in Russia, as in most countries. The first, dispute resolution through private arbitration, is benign. The second, enforcement by private agents often through intimidation, is more ominous, both for the parties and for society more generally. Our data indicate that neither is an important strategy for Russian enterprises.
Private arbitration tribunals, known as treteiskie courts, have always existed in Russia (Vinogradova 1997; Pistor 1996; Halverson 1996) Halverson (1996, p. 92) notes that "in spite of the many domestic arbitration tribunals that have been established in Russia during recent years, these tribunals are seldom utilized by Russian businessmen." According to Hendrix (1997 Hendrix ( , p. 1080 , about 500 cases are filed each year with the International Commercial Arbitration Court in Moscow, the busiest of the treteiskie sudy. The caseload has remained at this level since 1992. By contrast, the arbitrazh courts decided more than 340,000 cases in 1997, more than 11 percent of which were heard in Moscow. (See Sudebno-arbitrazhnaya statistical 1998) 8. In the pilot study for our survey (Hendley et al. 1997) , enterprises sometimes reported that the mafia simply implemented the judgments of the arbitrazh courts.
9. If one assumed that the mafia specializes in debt collection, one might conclude that this result reflects our focus on supplier relationships rather than customer problems. But even if the assumption is correct, the conclusion is not. More than half of the contracts that we studied involve prepayment, so that supplier non-performance is the most likely cause of a breach.
barriers to the use of treteiskii courts and the increased ease of access, the data in Table 6 indicate that few enterprises are using them.
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The most common image of private enforcement in Russia is the notorious mafia, i.e., enforcement by private coercion. A common wisdom has emerged in the media and even among scholars, that Russian enterprises routinely rely on private enforcement and, absent such services, would not be able to stay in business. For example, Leitzel et al. (1995, pp. 28-29) argue that, "...perhaps [the mafia's] main benefit is contract enforcement....Unsavory as the mafia's enforcement tactics are, they give Russian business people the confidence to enter into contracts that would otherwise be too risky." This is grounded in the assumption that the arbitrazh courts are unworkable (Shlapentokh 1997, p. 875; Black and Kraakman 1996, p. 1926) . However, our data show that the assumed futility of appealing to the courts is much overstated. The responses reported in Table 5 hardly suggest that enterprises would turn to the mafia out of frustration with the arbitrazh courts.
8 Moreover, Table 6 shows only very limited use of private enforcers to encourage contractual compliance: less than 3% enterprises had used private firms to prevent or resolve problems with suppliers. Shadow of the Law. In our question to the purchasing managers, there was no specific element focusing on the "shadow of the law". But other data obtained from the survey shows that for every case that goes to arbitrazh courts, there are six disputes that involve threats of going to court. Hence, the data on the frequency of use of the courts and their effectiveness suggest that the shadow of law is also a common means of contract enforcement in Russia.
Litigation. Table 6 clearly refutes the conventional wisdom that enterprises are shunning the courts.
Enterprises clearly regard the courts as a viable option when negotiated settlements prove elusive, 25%
having filed claims specifically against suppliers in the two years prior to our survey. (More than half of the enterprises had filed some sort of claim in arbitrazh court in the previous year.) Enterprises give the courts a relatively high ranking in terms of effectiveness. It is clear that, apart from direct enterprise-toenterprise contacts, threatened or actual use of the courts is the most important method of contract enforcement in Russia. The legal system clearly plays a role in contract enforcement in Russia.
IV. What Affects the Value of Transactions?
It is possible, though unlikely, that the foregoing results reflect a situation where enterprises are merely taking a passive legal stance, invoking the courts as a last option when problems are otherwise intractable. If this were the case, then the legal system might be simply distributing the wreckage of a failed relationship, rather than adding value to the transactions. The present section asks whether the use of law indeed adds value to the interactions between Russian enterprises.
The ensuing analysis examines data on a set of individual transactions, one from each surveyed enterprise. To obtain these data, the surveyors asked each sales manager to focus on one specific transaction in answering a battery of questions, on enterprise characteristics specifically pertinent to this transaction, the characteristics of the partner enterprise, the nature of the agreement between them, and -16-10. The respondents were asked to pick one agreement that envisaged consummation in the six months before the survey. Respondents were specifically instructed that they could choose either a successful or an unsuccessful agreement.
11. A partial exception is Palay (1984) in a very non-standard market.
the results of the transaction. 10 In addition, many of the more general pieces of data collected on our survey, on the enterprise as a whole, are pertinent here.
IV.a The Dependent Variables
The ideal data set to examine the value of law would be one that included measures of the net benefits of a transaction for both parties. Such data are purely an ideal, for two reasons. First, it is nigh impossible anywhere to match data from both sides of a transaction. 11 Second, it is inconceivable in present-day Russia that enterprises keep books on the costs and benefits of specific transactions.
Aware of the impossibility of obtaining a monetary measure of the net benefits of the specific transaction, we asked sales managers for their subjective assessment of success on the one agreement on which they were focusing. The question was phrased as follows:
Please evaluate how satisfied your enterprise was with this agreement and with the customer's performance under the terms of this agreement. Convey your views by choosing points on scales from 0 to 10. A '0' means that the relationship with the customer was very unsatisfactory and a 10 means that the relationship with the customer was very satisfactory. Indicate a separate score for each of the three criteria indicated below: Timeliness of payment Payment received compared to expectations Overall evaluation of the success of the agreement.
We will denote the score on each of these variables as timeliness, payment, and success (T, P, and S).
A cursory investigation of the properties of these variables confirms that they are valid indicators of the value of the transactions to the enterprise. They are highly correlated with other variables that are related to success, such as the presence and intensity of disputes, whether the enterprise intends to trade again with its partner, and whether there were delays in implementing the contract.
-17-Not surprisingly, these three variables are highly inter-correlated, but the correlation between timeliness and payment is the weakest of the three partial correlations, suggesting that these two variables do capture somewhat different phenomena. The timeliness variable is almost surely an indicator of whether the agreement is fulfilled without any problems. But this is not the same as success: an enterprise might have taken risks in order to secure higher profits and while some of these risks might have rebounded on the enterprise, it might have finished up better off after recourse to enforcement mechanisms. In the following analyses, we find that payment is the weakest of the three variables, perhaps because respondents answer this question without discounting for delays.
There are two building blocks of the econometric analysis. First, the temporal structure of interactions between the enterprises suggests the structure of the equations to be examined. Second, the standard transactions costs framework indicates which specific variables should be included. We examine each of these in turn.
IV.b The Equations to be Estimated.
The process pertinent to our analysis begins when two enterprises meet and negotiate over an agreement. They bring to the table a set of characteristics that are predetermined, such as the nature of the good (e.g., whether special investment is needed for manufacture), features of the enterprise (e.g., legal human capital) and its customer (e.g., size), joint properties of the two enterprises (e.g., previous interactions), and market structure (e.g. amount of competition). Denote all of these characteristics by the vector-valued variable X. The parties then negotiate an agreement, which has terms A (e.g., whether pre-payment occurs), also a vector-valued variable. A is a function of the above characteristics:
Perhaps all will go smoothly, and the agreement will be implemented in a timely fashion. But in Russia today this is far from the norm and problems are likely. One or both enterprises will then invoke enforcement mechanisms (such as those referred to in 13. At the same time, the effect of variables having a negative impact on T, P, and S, such as those creating a potential for holdup, might be diminished by countervailing elements in A. However, this does not detract from our argument of the importance of estimating the reduced form, given our variables of interest.
implementations and attempts at enforcement. At the end of this process, the enterprise can look back on this series of events and characterize T, P, and S. This process naturally leads to a set of structural equations, T = f T (A, X), P = f P (A, X), and S = f S (A, X), and consequently to a set of reduced forms: T = h T (X), P = h P (X), and S = h S (X).
There is a choice of relationships to estimate. In the literature, the usual focus is on A=g(X).
12
However, a variable can add value to transactions without influencing the structure of agreements. For example, when lawyers are useful in litigation but contracts are standard, the legal human capital of the enterprise might not be significant in g(.), but will belong in f T (.), f P (.), and f S (.) and consequently in the reduced forms. Thus, given the present focus on whether law and legal institutions add value, it is sufficient to examine the reduced form. Significance of the law-related variables in the reduced form would be sufficient to establish that they are important in practice, even if the reduced form does not give precise information on how these variables come to be important.
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IV.c The Explanatory Variables
The standard transactions cost analysis (Williamson 1985) drives the selection of explanatory variables to be included in the equations. Agreements take time to implement and one party will incur costs before the other. This exposes one enterprise to the possible opportunism of its trading partner, with incentives to demand renegotiation being spurred by the knowledge that bargaining strengths change once costs are sunk. The possibility of opportunism being costly, the value of the transaction will therefore depend upon factors that increase the potential for opportunism. But problems can be mitigated by the use of law or by the development of a relationship: the transaction is more valuable for those enterprises that are able to use law or that can generate productive relationships.
-19-14. Note that the effects of legal variables need not be explicit in contracts nor in court appearances. Bargaining can occur in the shadow of the law and better prepared enterprises might never need to emerge from the shadows.
The transactions-cost perspective therefore suggests focusing on three distinct sets of variables, capturing the potential for hold-up, the probability of successful relational contracting, and the nature and quality of enterprise legal resources. Given the focus on the reduced form, we use variables that are exogenous to the agreement on which we have data, describing factors that pre-exist the negotiations between the enterprises on this particular agreement. Table 7 lists the variables, giving definitions and summary statistics. The reader should refer to that table when variables are introduced below since space constraints prohibit re-stating all definitions within the text. We begin by describing the law-related variables because these are the ones that are most distinctive to this study and provide the results that are of greatest significance in interpreting events in present-day Russia.
The Legal Human Capital of the Enterprise and its Internal Organization on Legal Matters
The statutory and institutional basis of the law affecting transactions between enterprises has changed vastly since 1991 (Hendley 1998a,b,c; Pistor 1996) . So has the environment in which enterprises interact, especially the transactional hazards that they face. Echoing the divergence of opinion among western observers, it is surely the case that enterprises have made varied judgments about the importance of law in the new environment. As a result, decisions on law-related restructuring will vary.
Across the sample of enterprises, there will also be diversity in internal organization on legal matters that was inherited from the previous system. All these variations give us much opportunity to study whether law matters to Russian enterprises. Given that restructuring is crucial and that there is much guesswork in deciding which way to commit the enterprise, the presence and amount of resources might be secondary to how resources are utilized. For example, enterprises that did not restructure would pay attention to contractual matters since labor issues dominated before 1991. To gauge the enterprise's commitment to using the law to solve transactional problems, the survey asked the respondent for the legal questionnaire 15 to report on the allocation of time on different legal issues. The variable LAWCONTRACT reflects whether this respondent often spent time "designing or revising sales contracts".
The nature and quality of legal human capital obviously affects the output of legal work. Variations in human capital could be especially important in an environment where just six years inattention could have led to woeful ignorance on the most basic legal issues. To create one measure of the quality of legal capital, we "tested" survey respondents on their knowledge of elementary aspects of contract law, asking questions about collateral law, the priority of the government on the claims of bankrupt enterprises, and the form of legal contracts. Three enterprise officials were asked questions on contracts (the general director, the sales director, and the procurement director) assessing how well the new legal knowledge had permeated the enterprise. LAWKNOW measures the composite "test score"for these officials. It is undoubtedly a crude measure of legal human capital, but vastly better than using educational attainment In contrast, the successful past use of petitions to freeze a defendant's assets (FREEZE) is an indicator of aggressive use of new opportunities. During the Soviet period, the law did not allow such petitions. All industrial enterprises were state-owned and judgments tended to be small and easily collected, making the seizure of assets superfluous. Petitions to freeze a defendants' assets were introduced in the first post-Soviet procedural code for the arbitrazh courts in 1992 and current law allows plaintiffs to make such a petition at any point during a case (Arts. 75-76 1995 APK). Since the law leaves the decision to grant a petition largely to the judge's discretion, obtaining such an order requires an understanding of the informal norms of the arbitrazh courts and an ability to convince the judge that the defendant is likely to abscond with its assets if the order is not issued.
-22-It is worthy of emphasis that none of the explanatory variables introduced above specifically measures aspects of the agreements under study: they all refer to general enterprise characteristics. Thus, for example, when we later show that FREEZE has a significant effect on transactional performance, that result does not reflect an attempt to freeze the assets of the partner in the specific agreement included in the data set. Rather, the result must reflect the fact that more successful transactions are conducted by enterprises with the ability and insight to make use of new legal opportunities.
Relationships
It is a standard to assume that long-term relationships can reduce transacting problems (Macaulay 1963 , Williamson 1985 A crucial element affecting the sustainability of long-term relationships is the expectation of continuity: each party must expect that the other will survive the current sea of troubles and that a sufficient number of key enterprise personnel will remain in place for personal trust to survive in the longer-term. Such expectations depend upon several factors. First, there is the simple fact of economic viability. Second, enterprise ownership might affect the probability of weathering harder times. Third, there is corporate governance, whether new owners are likely to replace key enterprise personnel rapidly.
Fourth, outside help might be available to secure survival during bad times. The following paragraphs introduce the pertinent variables for the reporting (selling) enterprise. The central hypothesis in those paragraphs is that the customer knows the value of these variables and uses this knowledge to judge whether to behave as if in a longer-term relationship or whether to view each transaction in isolation.
-23-16. Because much activity is unofficial in Russia, the use of profits would be ineffective as an indicator of viability.
17. See Earle and Estrin (1997) for a more sophisticated point of view.
18. Outsider-controlled enterprises are more likely to sacrifice present transactional success for more long-run efficiency.
BADTIMES, the percentage of employees on a short work-week, captures the economic viability of the enterprise. Over the past few years, many Russian enterprises have been unable to pay their workers on time. Wage payments are frequently delayed for months. Some enterprises have responded by limiting the work week to two or three days. Hence, this variable measures the basic financial circumstances of the enterprise. 16 But not too much importance should be attached to the results for this variable in the context of relationships, since this variable might simply be a proxy for the overall ability of the enterprise to produce profitable transactions.
Our ownership measures reflect the post-privatization environment. NEWPRIVATE firms have the greatest variance in performance: although they might perform much better than old state enterprises on average, their average survival probability is surely lower. A simple categorization would split privatized enterprises into those controlled by the state, by outsiders, and by employees. 17 We therefore include in our regressions STATEOWN and EMPOWN, with outsider ownership the omitted category (since these three ownerships sum to 100). We assume that state ownership leads to an implicit state guarantee of survival. Earle and Estrin (1996) note that employee ownership could have some advantages in sharing the pain of hard times and therefore that, while employee ownership has disadvantages on the upswing, a partner might forecast a higher survival probability for such an enterprise. In addition, stability of personnel is likely to be greater for employee-owned enterprises.
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Control might be more important than ownership, however. Some employee-owned enterprises are controlled by managers or outsiders while others are truly under the control of the employees. Since direct measures of control are unavailable, to gain some indication of employee control, we use a -24-constructed interaction variable: EMPCONTROL = EMPOWN*BADTIMES. Both elements of this variable are correlated with employee control, the first through ownership and the second because an outsider-controlled enterprise will reduce employment by firing whereas an employee-controlled enterprise will spread the pain across many employees who are placed on a shorter work-week. The interaction of these two effects is likely to lead to a variable that is more highly correlated with employee control than either of the two component variables separately.
The last set of indicators of survival probabilities reflect the enterprise's relationships with institutional actors. The soft budget constraint is notorious in the history of Russia and it is likely to be one factor on the minds of potential trading partners who are worrying whether an enterprise has an incentive to preserve a long-term relationship. The three variables that we use, GOVSUB, TAXSUB, and BANKSUB, indicate whether the enterprise has had access to direct subsidies from the government (including directed credits), relief from the tax authorities, or help from banks. Given institutional arrangements in Russia, the bank variable could also be an indicator of factors other than simply softbudgets. Enterprises in debt, especially those with tax arrears, might find it difficult to execute business operations because the bank will be under orders to send to creditors all funds flowing through the enterprise's primary bank account. A good relationship with a bank might help an enterprise escape this problem, implying that the last of these three variables might simply capture the ability of the company to conduct its transactions smoothly.
Indicators of the Potential for Hold-Up
Certain features of goods or of markets make some transactions intrinsically more prone to problems of opportunism. Both parties perceive such problems before they negotiate, and suitably structured agreements can lessen such problems. But, these agreements might entail extra costs, resulting in a transaction that is less satisfactory than a zero transactions-cost agreement (which anyway could have only been implemented by angels). Therefore, variables reflecting the potential for hold-up will be -25-related to the ex ante costs of abating opportunism and inversely to the success of transactions. (Here, ex ante is taken to imply that the costs are anticipated before any aspect of the agreement is implemented.)
It might not be possible, nor indeed profit-maximizing, to remove completely the potential for hold-up. If opportunism does occur during implementation, then one party might gain at the expense of the other or internecine struggle might ensue, reducing the value of the agreement to both parties.
Because our dependent variable reflects the value of the transaction to only one enterprise, our interpretation of the regression results will admit the possibility that one party can gain from opportunism even in the presence of a decline in the aggregate value of the transaction. Hence, in interpreting the regression results, one must assess which variables indicate the possibility of ex post benefits of hold-up for the reporting enterprise and which indicate ex post losses from hold-up, ex post here referring to events after the beginning of implementation of the agreement.
When a good is custom-made or when the customer must make special investments in order to use the good of a specific producer, the potential for hold-up increases. We use two variables to capture this phenomenon, CUSTOMMADE, and CUSTOMUSE. When the supplier (the enterprise evaluating the success of the agreement) custom-makes the product, the ex ante and ex post effects of hold-up mutually reinforce each other, both imposing costs on the supplier. In contrast, when the customer invests specially in this transaction, the two effects can be in opposite directions for the supplier. Thus, one would expect our data to show a stronger effect for CUSTOMMADE than for CUSTOMUSE. If indeed this is the case, then it is evidence that hold-up is actually happening.
A similar story appertains to the degree of dependence of the enterprises on this particular transaction. One indicator of such dependence is the relative size of the interaction between the two enterprises. SUPPWEAK and CUSTWEAK measure whether the transacting parties conduct a large share of their trade with each other. When a particular customer is important for a supplier or when a particular supplier is important for the customer, the party that is deeply dependent on the other incurs large costs if -26-the transaction does not take place, either because the supplier has capacity dedicated to this transaction (Williamson 1985) or because the customer will find it difficult to replace a supply source quickly (Joskow 1987) . In developed market economies, vertical integration would have probably been the result. But, given the obvious inattention to market-style transaction costs under the old Soviet system and given the limited amount of time for mergers in the new Russian market, one can assume that our survey data includes inter-enterprise transactions that would have been intra-enterprise in a settled market economy.
A similar analysis applies to the existence of other customers and other suppliers (OTHERCUST and OTHERSUPP) . If the supplier has a wide variety of other customers then there is a greater potential for hold-up problems, but if hold-up actually occurs it might benefit the supplier. In contrast, when the customer has other suppliers, the ex ante bargaining effect and the ex post possibility of actual hold-up combine to decrease the likelihood of a successful agreement for the supplier.
The variables described above examine the effect of increases in dependence on only one side of the transaction. Kranton (1996) , however, shows that mutual dependence can lead to a viable, long-term relationship. This prediction is examined using the variable BIMONOP.
The competition variables described above all measure actual number of trading partners rather than potential ones. Of course, these two could be identical since there must be reasons why a supplying enterprise does not sell its goods to a customer enterprise that is buying the same good from elsewhere. This is all the more likely in Russia where legacies of the old system, transportation problems, and weak transactional infrastructure all combine to produce thin markets. Nevertheless, for completeness we do examine a potential competition variable on the supplier side: COMPETITION examines the amount of competition in the market in which the supplying enterprise sells.
Other Variables -27-A few variables are included in the analysis as controls, to forestall omitted variable bias. Foremost among these are REGIONAL DUMMIES, designed to capture both institutional and economic variations across regions. We also include variables measuring the enterprise's AGE and whether the enterprise is the largest in its region (LARGE) in order to capture any political-institutional effects that result from an enterprise's veneration or its muscle. Finally, NEWPROD is a dummy variable indicating whether the good that is the subject of the transaction is newly produced during the era of reform. With the old system inadequately catering to the needs of consumers, it is quite likely that agreements on the exchange of new products are, ceteris paribus, more successful than agreements on old products.
IV.d The Results
Given the nature of the timeliness, payment, and success variables, ordered probit is the natural We estimate the parameters 0 ,..., 9 , and using ordered probit methods. Tables 8 and 9 contain the results. Table 9 addresses.
To explain the structure of Table 9 , first focus on a dummy explanatory variable. Using the estimated coefficients and the actual data for enterprise i on all but the dummy variable of interest, we make two predictions of Y i , one with the dummy variable set to 0 and one with it set to 1. The columns Table 9 .) To obtain the two predictions in the continuous case, we set the variable of interest at the actual value for the enterprise plus one-half of a standard deviation and then at the actual value minus one-half of a standard deviation.
We now turn to the results in Tables 8 and 9 , focusing on the most important ones rather than reiterating all that is found in the tables.
Legal Human Capital and Internal Organization on Legal Matters
Ceteris paribus, whether the enterprise has access to legal resources, and where these resources come from, is not an important factor in transactional success. (The omitted category from this set of dummy variables is no formal legal advice at all.) But recent changes in the use of legal resources are significant, although in an asymmetric way. Although increases in legal inputs (LAWUP) do not significantly improve transactional performance, decreases (LAWDOWN) have a negative effect. This suggests difficulties in restructuring an enterprise's legal operations: while enterprises lose if they reduce pre-existing legal operations, expansion of legal activities does not produce gains. Although this paper's -29-emphasis is not on restructuring, this result is notable since we have identified an asymmetric adjustment effect, which some have suggested is a cause of the decline in economic activity in transition countries.
By far the most significant results of this paper, both statistically and economically, are those on the variables that measure levels of legal human capital and how that capital is used. There are four such variables. Of the twelve estimated coefficients in Table 8 , eleven have the predicted signs and eight are significant at the 5% level (and the results are even stronger if one ignores the equation that performs badly, the "payment" equation.) These results suggest that time invested by lawyers in contract work pays off (LAWCONTRACT), that better knowledge of law among enterprise officials results in a greater likelihood of payment being received on time (LAWKNOW), that an enterprise that keeps to the old methods of contracting does less well (PROTOKOLS), and that an ability to adapt to the new, as indicated by previous success on freezing assets, helps to secure payment (FREEZE).
The pattern of results across the three different dependent variables reinforces the perception that Table 8 presents important evidence on the role of law in Russian enterprises. FREEZE has its largest effect on securing payment but not on timeliness, indicating that it is most relevant after a relationship has soured. Work on contracts (LAWCONTRACT) has an effect across the board implying that careful attention to contract issues can both prevent problems and protect the enterprise when problems occur.
Knowledge of the law that exists outside the legal department (LAWKNOW) has more importance in preventing problems (timeliness) than in making sure payments are finally received, which is natural since officials in the sales department are less likely to play an important role after a transaction has soured than when it is in process.
The numerical significance of the results is captured in Table 9 . Let us examine the effect of the four legal-human-capital variables (LAWCONTRACT, LAWKNOW, PROTOKOLS, and FREEZE). One summary statistic derived from that Table is evocative. An enterprise making the "right" decisions on these variables would have scored 36% better on timeliness, 17% better on payment, and 27% better on -30-success than an enterprise making the wrong decision. Although this statement is based on very crude calculations, it does speak volumes about the extent to which law and legal institutions can be valuable for the Russian enterprise.
Are these results reflective of one-sided gains in the transaction, in which the enterprise that is better prepared on legal issues is able to obtain disproportionate benefits, or are they indicative of an increase in the aggregate value added from the transaction? We cannot know the answer to this question for sure, because our data do not allow us to address this problem directly. But we suspect that the gains are mutual. Note that the legal variables have their strongest total effect on timeliness, which is the best indicator of a transaction that has proceeded smoothly. Note also that LAWCONTRACT, LAWKNOW, and PROTOKOLS all have an effect on the general quality of contracting, as well as on the value of the contract to the reporting enterprise. A contract that is clear and enforceable reduces transactions costs for both sides by coordinating expectations during implementation and by diminishing the costs of disputes.
Since Arbitrazh court cases rely almost completely on the documentary record, any improvement in the legality and the clarity of a contract increases the enforceability of the contract for both parties.
Relationships
The variables indicating the possibilities for forming long-term relationships do not appear to be as important as the law-related variables. While the effect of the supplier's present plight (BADTIMES) is negative and highly significant, this variable might be proxying the enterprise's generally poor performance as well as the effect on relationships of an expectation of a diminished survival probability.
The most interesting results on relationships are those on ownership and control. For these variables, eleven of the twelve signs are as predicted. State ownership has a significant positive effect on the overall success of the transaction and employee control has a significant positive effect on both overall success and timeliness. Given the general expectation that state-owned and employee-owned enterprises would have poorer performance on enterprise restructuring than outsider-owned ones, these -31-19. Contrast McMillan and Woodruff (1998) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (1999) . results suggest that transactional success is enhanced by a higher expected survival probability and a lower expected turnover of personnel. The results here suggest that the effects of privatization on the expected survival of an enterprise could be an important factor in general enterprise performance in the early years of transition. As in the case of restructuring, this is an issue that is not a focus of our paper, but nevertheless its results appear to highlight an important phenomenon.
Only one of the subsidy variables (BANKSUB) has any statistical significance, on timeliness, probably indicating the importance of having a friendly bank in the practical aspects of securing payments. The sign of GOVSUB is consistent with the logic of the previous paragraph.
Surprisingly, given the general tenor of the results in Table 6 , the dummy variable reflecting length of relationship (NEWRELATION) is not significant, nor is the proximity variable. 19 One variable bearing on the ability to form relationships, BIMONOP, is significant, but consideration of this result is postponed since it is more informative in the context of the variables capturing the potential for hold-up.
The Potential for Hold-Up
The sign and significance of the custom-made variable indicates that hold-up problems are a reality in Russia, especially when one considers these results in comparison to those on the custom-use variable.
The larger negative effect of CUSTOMMADE than CUSTOMUSE indicates that the selling enterprise is gaining from ex-post hold-up in some circumstances. Nevertheless, it is important to note the negative (albeit non-significant) sign on the custom-use variable. This indicates that the ex-post advantages from hold-up do not outweigh the ex ante contracting problems of selling a custom-used product.
The results for the variables capturing dependence on the trading partner (CUSTWEAK and SUPPWEAK) also highlight the notion that market characteristics produce interactions where transacting costs are very high. When the customer is dependent on the supplier (CUSTWEAK), the transaction is -32-significantly less beneficial for the supplier despite the potential that such dependence holds for supplier gains from ex post opportunism, indicating very high ex ante costs from the potential for hold-up.
Why might such costs be very high in present-day Russia? In the old Soviet system, decisions on the scope of internal organization did not involve the calculus of market-determined transaction costs.
These decisions have not been negated in only six years of market activity. Therefore, our data set surely contains transactions that would not have been observable in a settled market economy because they would have been between separate divisions of one organization. Such transactions would likely be those where the dummy variable CUSTWEAK equals one, because a relatively large purchase by a customer is likely to be a crucial input into its production process. Obviously, a similar argument does not apply when the transaction is relatively large for the supplier (SUPPWEAK). Hence, the relative sizes and significances of the CUSTWEAK and SUPPWEAK variables suggest that our results reflect the transitional costs of decisions that were made on firm boundaries under the Soviet system.
The results for the variables capturing the presence of other customers and suppliers (OTHERCUST and OTHERSUPP) suggest the existence of ex post gains from hold-up. This result is consistent with the argument in Blanchard and Kremer (1997) that expanding opportunities cause transactional disorganization. However, a more prosaic interpretation is also possible. An enterprise with more opportunities can probably extract a better deal ex ante from each of its partners. Although we do control for competition in general (COMPETITION), the positive sign on OTHERCUST could simply represent the bargaining strength of a firm that has been relatively successful in attracting many customers.
The foregoing results highlight the large costs that arise when the nature of the product or of market structure lead to a transaction that is particularly prone to opportunism. However, as Kranton (1996) argues, the costs of opportunism might actually decrease when both parties perceive a mutual dependence on each other. It is an increase in dependence on one side only that leads to the costs of opportunism.
-33-When enterprises are truly stuck with each other, they have more incentive to build a working relationship. We examine this prediction with the variable BIMONOP, which has a significant effect.
V. Conclusions and Reflections
The most important results of this paper appear in Section IV where the effect of law rings clear, a very surprising result given the tenor of the existing literature on Russia. The institutional environment rewards enterprises that pay attention to the legal side of their operations. Better transactional performance occurs when the legal staff works extensively on contractual matters, when enterprise personnel possess larger amounts of legal human capital (as evidenced by legal knowledge and the ability to obtain orders to freeze assets), when old contractual practices (protokols of disagreement) have been forsaken, and when the enterprise reorients itself to the new legal opportunities (freezing assets).
We interpret these results as providing evidence that law and legal institutions add value to the Russian economy. They add value, rather than simply redistributing it, because many law-related transactional activities simultaneously provide benefits for both trading partners. For example, a clear and enforceable contract reduces transactions costs for both sides, by coordinating expectations during implementation and by making the outcome of disputes more predictable. Moreover, by improving the legality and clarity of a contract, an enterprise increases enforceability for both parties.
These results break new ground in a several ways. First, we provide a new methodology for examining how law, relationships, and the potential for hold-up affect the success of transactions, a methodology that focuses on economic activity at the level at which law operates, the individual transaction. Our implementation of this methodology shows that the search for effects of law must delve below the surface of the operations of the enterprise. Had we simply used the quantity of legal inputs in our regressions, we would not have detected any affect of the enterprise's use of law. Rather, when the institutional landscape is difficult to fathom, with law changing very quickly, there is wide variation in -34-20. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (1999) make a similar conclusion for a set of five transition countries, including Russia. the quality of legal inputs and in the way in which these inputs are used. The quality of inputs and the way they are applied, not quantity, are the significant law-related variables.
Second, our results show that Russian legal-economic institutions do have an effect. 20 We find the strength of these institutions echoed in the transactional performance of enterprises that are able to use them. Nevertheless, our results also show that opportunism occurs frequently: the results for goods that are custom-used, for customer dependence, and for the number of alternative customers provide clear evidence on that score. This is not surprising. Even if transactional problems were completely solvable by good legal practice, which we doubt, many enterprises could not find the solutions. There are many enterprises that have not restructured their legal operations, that still use protokols, that work little on contracts, and whose personnel are not conversant with current law. These features of our results suggest potential sources of economic growth in Russia. The enterprises that have been successful in using law to facilitate transactions provide a demonstration effect for unrestructured enterprises. Moreover, our results suggest that the law and legal institutions pertinent to transactions are available to support a growing set of transactions should these be spurred by improvements in banking, tax policy, and other elements of the Russian institutional landscape that are responsible for the present plight.
Lastly, our results provide one pixel of a picture whose significance goes far beyond Russia and beyond transition. To gain a better understanding of processes of legal and economic development, it is crucial to assess how quickly effective capitalist institutions arise and what factors determine the success of new institutions. This paper shows that the arbitrazh court system is an example of a relatively successful institution in present-day Russia. The institutional reforms that led to the present court system were much less politicized than many other reforms, much more driven by the concerns of professionals within the legal system than politicians, suggesting themes in the literature that go back at least as far as -35-Weber. These reforms involved the transformation of an old system, gosarbitrazh, rather than creating a new institution from a tabula rasa, an issue that was of much contention in the early debates on transition. Whether these were important elements in determining outcomes is a subject for further investigation. The importance of such an investigation is justified by the results in this paper, which
show that the law and legal institutions pertinent to contract enforcement might constitute a relatively
bright light in what is often regarded as a dismal scene, the development of capitalist institutions in Russia. Survey respondents were asked to rate the relative effectiveness of private enforcement and arbitrazh courts in resolving disputes, using five criteria. The answers were placed on a 0 to 10 scale, a '0' response indicating an absolute preference for private enforcement based on the criterion, '10' indicating an absolute preference for Arbitrazh courts based on the criterion, and '5' showing indifference. Notes: Values in bold are the ones derived from coefficients that are statistically significant in Table 7 Type of variable: D = dummy; C = continuous
Criterion
